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Abstract This paper aims to address two issues related to simultaneous aggregation
of utilities and beliefs. The first one is related to how to integrate both inequality
and uncertainty considerations into social decision making. The second one is related
to how social decision should take disagreements in beliefs into account. To accom-
plish this, whereas individuals are assumed to abide by Savage model’s of subjective
expected utility, society is assumed to prescribe, either to each individual when the
ex ante individual well-being is favored or to itself when the ex post individual well-
being is favored, acting in accordance with the maximin expected utility theory of
Gilboa and Schmeidler (J Math Econ 18:141–153, 1989). Furthermore, it adapts an ex
ante Pareto-type condition proposed by Gayer et al. (J Legal Stud 43:151–171, 2014),
which says that a prospect Pareto dominates another one if the former gives a higher
expected utility than the latter one, for each individual, for all individuals’ beliefs. In
the context where the ex ante individual welfare is favored, our ex ante Pareto-type
condition is shown to be equivalent to social utility taking the form of a MaxMin-
Min social welfare function, as well as to the individual set of priors being contained
within the range of individual beliefs. However, when the ex post individual welfare
is favored, the same Pareto-type condition is shown to be equivalent to social utility
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taking the form of a MaxMinMin social welfare function, as well as to the social set
of priors containing only weighted averages of individual beliefs.
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JEL Classification D60 · D63 · D70 · D81
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
The paper addresses two issues related to the assessment of social prospects under
uncertainty (that is, when only subjective probability assessments of the source of
uncertainty can be formed). The first one is related to how to integrate both inequality
and uncertainty considerations into social decision making. The second one is related
to how social decision should take disagreements in beliefs into account. The two
issues are inseparably related to one another, as inequality aversion and uncertainty
aversion are particularly compelling when individuals disagree on beliefs.
In the context of uncertainty, inequality concerns have generated two approaches
to the evaluation of social prospects. The ex ante approach first computes individuals’
expected utilities and then assesses prospects by applying a certain egalitarian social
welfare criterion to the distributions of ex ante utility values that the computation has
generated. The ex post approach first assesses the distributions of individual utility
values in each state according to a certain egalitarian social welfare criterion and then
evaluates prospects by applying a certain decision-theoretic criterion to these data.
Ben-Porath et al. (1997) claim that neither approach is fully satisfactory. By means
of examples which we will revisit below, they aptly argue that to take into account both
ex ante and ex post inequality considerations, ‘inequality and uncertainty need to be
analyzed in tandem’ (Ben-Porath et al. 1997, p. 195). In other words, inequality aver-
sion and uncertainty aversion of the ‘social observer’ are two sides of the same coin.1
However, it has been shown (Mongin and Pivato 2015; Zuber 2016) that once we
impose both approaches to be commutative with each other, there is no possibility of
using any other method of social aggregation aside from utilitarianism, which excludes
not only any concern of fairness but also any concern of uncertainty. This impossibility
result thus forces us to choose between the two approaches if we want a sufficiently
sharp and meaningful social welfare criterion.
This motivates us to characterize a class of social welfare criteria for each approach
as well as to integrate as many merits of one approach as possible into the other
approach.
Belief disagreement is known to be a severe obstacle for social decision making
under uncertainty. Mongin (1995, 1998) shows that under belief disagreements the
social ordering of prospects cannot satisfy both subjective expected utility (SEU)
1 By ‘social observer’ we do not mean a concrete individual but, instead, a pure aggregate or an abstract
entity. ‘Social observer’ and ‘society’ will be used interchangeably.
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theory à la Savage and the ex ante variant of the Pareto principle, which prescribes
that unanimous ex ante preferences should be respected. Chambers and Hayashi (2014)
show that the source of the impossibility is that the social welfare criterion is state
dependent under ex ante Pareto. For example, if Amy believes it will be sunny and Bob
believes it will be rainy, then ex ante Pareto prescribes that Amy should receive more
resources if it will be sunny, otherwise Bob should receive more, but such welfare
weighting is dependent on whether it is sunny or rainy. Since the standard SEU theory
assumes state independence of outcome evaluation, in this paper the social observer
is not subjected to SEU theory.
Not only does ex ante Pareto lead to an impossibility but it also has a conceptual
problem that Mongin (2016) named as ‘spurious unanimity’. Individuals may unan-
imously agree on ranking uncertain prospects because of double-disagreements in
beliefs and tastes. An example by Gilboa et al. (2004) captures this: Amy and Bob are
deciding whether to duel or not. Amy believes she will win and she will be happy if
she wins. Bob believes he will win and he will be happy if he wins. The ex ante Pareto
prescribes that they should duel, but this is an absurd conclusion, as one of them is
eventually wrong.2
To avoid the problem, Gilboa et al. (2004) proposed an axiom called Consensus
Pareto, stating that the ex ante Pareto argument should follow only when all individuals
agree on probabilities of relevant events. However, the efficacy of this Pareto axiom
to avoid the problem relies on the fact that is formulated in the setting of a rich state
space à la Savage. Indeed, in this setup there is a rich class of events such that all
individuals agree on their probabilities. However, this is not the case when the state
space is not rich, such as when it is finite.
In the context of financial markets, Gayer et al. (2014) have proposed a weaker vari-
ant of the standard ex ante Pareto criterion, named Unanimity-Pareto (UP): Prospect u
UP-dominates prospect v if u gives a higher expected utility than v, for each individ-
ual, for all individuals’ beliefs. This restricted Pareto not only avoids the problem of
spurious unanimity but also provides a collective responsibility for individual beliefs.
This motivates us to use this Pareto axiom to check whether it is powerful enough
to allow us to rank between uncertain prospects in a discerning manner as well as to
aggregate utilities and beliefs into a social preference that is able to balance uncertainty
considerations against concerns for equality. Any further step away from the standard
ex ante Pareto criterion precipitates an ‘excess’ paternalism, which is arguable.
1.2 Outline
In this paper, an uncertain prospect takes the form of a matrix of utility values, with
indices of rows and columns representing individuals and states of nature, respec-
tively. Moreover, we consider the domain of state-contingent utility profiles, where
utility values are already risk-adjusted and assumed to be comparable across indi-
viduals and states. That is, when an uncertain prospect u = [uis]i∈I,s∈S is given,
2 Although the duel example has recently become popular to illustrate spurious unanimity, Mongin (1997)
introduces spurious unanimity in terms of a public good example, which seems to us more plausible.
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it means individual i(∈ I) receives utility uis at state s(∈ S). Also, we take indi-
vidual beliefs as parameter inputs. A typical profile of individual beliefs is denoted
by p = (pis)i∈I,s∈S , where pis is the probability that individual i assigns to
state s.
Such specification of the primitives can be justified as follows. When individuals’
preferences over bets (random variables) fall in the subjective expected utility theory
due to Savage (1972) and Anscombe and Aumann (1963), one can back up their
subjective beliefs over states of the world as a unique probability distribution and
their von-Neumann Morgenstern utility functions. This does not yet guarantee that
such utility functions are interpersonally comparable. For this reason, utility values
are taken to be interpersonally comparable throughout the paper.
By endorsing the ex ante egalitarian approach, we obtain that, for a given profile p
of individual beliefs, the social observer evaluates uncertain prospects in the form of
min
α∈I (p)
∑
i∈I
αi
(
min
σi ∈Si (p)
∑
s∈S
σisuis
)
,
where I (p) is the set of welfare weight vectors over individuals which add up to 1,
and Si (p) is the set of beliefs assigned to individual i by the social observer. In other
words, he evaluates an uncertain prospect u by first computing its expected value
for individual i with respect to the worst belief in Si (p) and then by computing the
weighted sum of these data with respect to the vector of welfare weights in I (p) that
put greater weight on worse-off individuals.
Here, the size of the set Si (p) reflects how much uncertainty aversion the social
observer exercises for individual i , whereas the size of I (p) reflects how much the
observer is averse to inequality.
However, by favoring the ex post approach, we obtain that for a given profile p
uncertain prospects are evaluated by
min
σ∈S(p)
∑
s∈S
σs
(
min
αs∈Is (p)
∑
i∈I
αsi uis
)
,
where Is (p) is a set of state-dependent vectors of welfare weights over individuals
which add up to 1, and S (p) is the social set of beliefs. Thus, to find the evaluation
of a prospect, the social observer needs first to compute the worst weighted sum of
individuals’ utilities in state s by using the weight vectors in Is(p) and then compute
the expected value of these data with respect to the worst belief in S (p).
Here, the size of set Is (p) reflects the inequality aversion of the observer in state
s, whereas the size of set S(p) reflects how much uncertainty aversion the observer
exercises for the whole society. Notice that the set Is (p) is state dependent, in general.
In this sense, the above representation does not fall into the standard SEU theory which
assumes state independence of outcome evaluation. In general, state dependence of
an outcome evaluation creates a difficulty in interpreting a subjective belief or set of
subjective beliefs, as we cannot distinguish whether the likelihood of some state is
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doubled or the intensity of outcome evaluation at that state is doubled.3 However, it
is worth mentioning that Karni et al. (1983) and Karni (1985) characterize models of
state-dependent preferences. These axiomatizations indicate how additional axioms
can permit to identify beliefs in the context of state-dependent preferences.
In the current setting, however, in which we take individual state-contingent utilities
to be comparable across individuals and states, it is legitimate to interpret S(p) as the set
of social beliefs. This is so because state dependence is only about relative weighting
over individuals and, moreover, intensity of evaluation of ex post social welfare is
invariant across states. In fact, when everybody receives equal utility at each state, the
above representation reduces to the multiple-expected utility that is quite standard in
the uncertainty aversion literature.
Further, we also study the consequences of imposing on each class of social decision
criteria two Pareto axioms. Despite it being widely recognized that the standard ex ante
Pareto principle is problematic, we consider it because our view is that although we
should not rely on it, neither should we exclude it altogether. The second one is what
we call Collective ex ante Pareto, which is in the spirit of, though logically stronger
than, the Unanimity-Pareto proposed by Gayer et al. (2014). More technically, this
variant has two parts: (a) Collective ex ante Pareto: if the expected utility of prospect
u is at least as large as the expected utility of prospect v, for each individual, for all
beliefs in p , then the social observer should respect this and judge u to be at least
as good as v ; (b) Collective ex ante strict Pareto: if every individual believes that
a prospect u is an improvement over another prospect v for herself and for all other
individuals and, moreover, she believes that at least one individual becomes strictly
better off, then u should be socially preferred to v. These properties capture the idea
that the society as a whole is responsible for its members’ beliefs and, moreover, avoids
the spurious unanimity problem.
In the ex ante approach, ex ante Pareto implies that Si (p) = {pi } for each individual
i , unsurprisingly, meaning that the observer must use individual i’s own belief in order
to calculate her ex ante individual welfare, while imposing no restriction on the set
of welfare weights. In contrast, Collective ex ante Pareto implies that the set Si (p)
of beliefs prescribed by society for individual i lies in the convex hull of individuals’
beliefs. This not only allows departure from taking individual belief as it is but also
allows for the role of uncertainty aversion. However, the level of uncertainty aversion
exercised by society toward each of its members cannot go beyond what is admitted
by the range of individuals’ beliefs.
In the ex post approach, imposing ex ante Pareto forces us to have only additive
aggregation across individuals and states; hence, it leaves no room for inequality aver-
sion and uncertainty aversion. In this sense, the ex post approach is less flexible when
3 It is worth mentioning that this problem applies even to the standard SEU theory which assumes state
independence of preference. There, after establishing a state-independent preference over outcomes, we
establish a state-independent von-Neumann–Morgenstern utility index defined over outcomes. This does
not have to be the case, however, because from observed choices alone we can never distinguish between
the subjective likelihood of an event and the intensity of the outcome evaluation upon that event. State
independence of preference over outcomes does not, by itself, imply state independence of utility scale
across states. It is nothing but a modeler’s choice to normalize utility scale uniformly across states and to
attribute intensity of an outcome evaluation to subjective likelihood of states.
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we are more in favor of the spirit of ex ante Pareto. On the other hand, Collective ex
ante Pareto allows for the integration of both inequality and uncertainty considerations
into social decision making. In this case, the social set of beliefs lies in the convex
hull of individuals’ beliefs. Thus, society does not add ambiguity beyond a weighted
average of individual beliefs.
Finally, based on the prominent examples appearing in the literature, we provide
a discussion on which class of social decisions provides more desirable or flexible
preference rankings of social prospects.
1.3 Related literature
The paper borrows from and extends a number of contributions to the literature on
simultaneous aggregation of utilities and beliefs, initiated by Harsanyi’s (1955) sem-
inal paper in the context of risk. Harsanyi (1955) shows that when individual and
social preferences satisfy the von-Neumann–Morgenstern axioms and, moreover, soci-
ety abides by ex ante Pareto, then social utility takes the form of a weighted sum of
individual utility representations.4 However, this social aggregation theorem runs into
difficulties when individuals have heterogeneous utilities and beliefs, that is, when we
move from risk to uncertainty. Indeed, Mongin (1995) shows that it is impossible to
aggregate SEU preferences of individuals into a social ranking that is consistent with
SEU theory as well as with ex ante Pareto. Chambers and Hayashi (2014) refine this
impossibility result by pinning down the Savage axioms that are incompatible with
ex ante Pareto. For a larger class of preferences, Gajdos et al. (2008) show that ex
ante Pareto is incompatible with the aggregation of SEU preferences into a consistent
social ranking when individuals possess non-neutral attitudes toward uncertainty.5
The strategy followed to escape these negative results has been to weaken either ex
ante Pareto or the Savage’s rationality requirements on either society or individuals, or
both, while retaining the ex post variant of the Pareto principle, which prescribes that
unanimous ex post preferences should be respected. In this paper, individuals follow
the SEU axioms, whereas society is assumed to prescribe, either to each individual
when the ex ante individual well-being is favored or to itself when the ex post individ-
ual is favored, following the maximin expected utility (MEU) theory of Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989). In contrast to the current literature, the paper offers representation
theorems for uncertainty-inequality-sensitive social preferences.
Gilboa et al. (2004) propose a Consensus Pareto axiom according to which the
ex ante Pareto argument should be applied only to unambiguous prospects, that is, in
those instances in which all individuals agree on probabilities of relevant events. In the
framework of Savage (1972), they show that this variant is equivalent to social utility
being a weighted average of individuals’ utilities as well as to social belief being a
4 Hammond (1981) is an excellent source for the incompatibility problem. By replacing the assumption
that the social observer is an expected utility maximizer with the requirement that he follows the state-wise
dominance criterion, Fleurbaey (2009) presents two variants of Harsanyi’s (1955) utilitarian theorem, one
based on continuity and the other on anonymity.
5 Recently, an original form of the impossibility result in which discount rates of individuals play the role
of individual priors has been shown by Jackson and Yariv (2015).
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weighted average of individuals’ beliefs. Furthermore, Alon and Gayer (2016) obtain a
generalization of Gilboa et al.’s representation theorem in the case of SEU individuals
and an MEU society. They show that a stronger variant of Consensus Pareto implies that
the social set of beliefs contains only a weighted average of individuals’ beliefs. In the
Anscombe and Aumann (1963) framework, Qu (2017) and Danan et al. (2016) derive
similar representation theorems for social preferences by employing other variants
of ex ante Pareto in a context where neither individuals nor society conforms to SEU
theory.6 All these variants of ex ante Pareto are proposed to avoid the pitfalls of ex ante
Pareto, and especially the problem of ‘spurious unanimity’, which is at the basis of the
impossibility result. In this vein, our Pareto-type condition avoids these problematic
cases where individuals agree for opposite reasons by requiring that society should
prefer prospect u to prospect v if u constitutes a Pareto improvement over v according
to all individuals’ beliefs.
As opposed to this and the papers mentioned above, which attempt to distinguish
between ‘genuine unanimity’ and ‘spurious unanimity’ by relying on individuals’
beliefs, Mongin and Pivato (2017) show that this endogenous criterion cannot escape
the problem of spurious unanimity when individuals are in a state of complementary
ignorance, that is, when individual beliefs arise from conditioning on private infor-
mation and each individual has information that other members of the society do not
have. To escape this problem, they formulate a model which exogenously distinguishes
between objective randomness (e.g., risk) and subjective uncertainty. In this setup, they
postulate that society abides by what they call objective interim Pareto, according to
which the ex ante Pareto argument applies only to cases where individuals agree for
objective reasons. They show that if society also abides by ex post Pareto and, more-
over, each individual has a well-defined invariant interim preference for each source
of uncertainty, then the social and individual preferences have SEU representations.
A marked contrast between our result and theirs is that in their framework the Pareto
axioms have the feature to endow society with a probability distribution that is not
related to individual beliefs.
Billot and Vergopoulos (2014) elaborate with a framework where society is allowed
to formulate probability judgements on the opinion each individual has on the actual
state of nature, rather than on the actual state as individuals do. They propose a set of
Pareto axioms and show that if individuals and society follow the Savage axioms, the
Pareto axioms are equivalent to social utility being a convex combination of individual
utilities as well as to social belief being an independent product of individual beliefs.
This interesting characterization result hinges on the assumption that individuals face
independent risk.
Other papers analyze the same issues in the context of financial markets. Posner
and Weyl (2013), Blume et al. (2015) and others identify contradictory beliefs as the
main cause for purely speculative trades, and they argue in favor of public regulation
of financial markets in this case.7 Gilboa et al. (2014) formulate a weaker variant of
6 Specifically, Qu (2017) assumes that both society and individuals conform to the MEU theory, whereas
Danan et al. (2016) consider the possibility that both society and individuals have Bewley-type preferences.
For an excellent introduction to the theory of decision under uncertainty, see Gilboa (2009).
7 Blume et al. (2015) propose a Rawlsian-type welfare criterion.
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the standard ex ante Pareto criterion, called No-Betting Pareto (NBP), according to
which prospect u NBP-dominates prospect v if u Pareto dominates v and if one can
find a probability measure p under which each individual strictly prefer u to v. They
show that NBP-dominance is equivalent to the existence of shared beliefs that can
rationalize such preference ranking for each individual and, moreover, they assess the
consequences of weakening ex ante Pareto to NBP-dominance comparisons in the
context of financial markets. The same type of analysis is continued in Gayer et al.
(2014) on the basis of Unanimity-Pareto. Brunnermeier et al. (2014) propose another
welfare criterion for markets when individuals hold heterogeneous distorted beliefs.
This criterion can be view as a variant of NBP criterion proposed by Gilboa et al.
(2014) given that the single belief under which each individual prefers u to v must be
a convex combination of individuals’ beliefs.
As opposed to the papers mentioned above, which aim to solve the problem of
spurious unanimity and to provide utilitarian-type representation theorems for social
preferences in various contexts, much less effort has been devoted so far to the consis-
tent aggregation of utilities and beliefs into a social preference that is able to balance
uncertainty considerations against a concern for equality.
To comply with Diamond’s (1967) thesis that ex ante inequality matters and that it
is normatively inappropriate to require that society and individuals abide by the same
decision rule, Epstein and Segal (1992) drop the assumption of expected social utility
and propose in the context of risk an axiom which captures a social preference for
randomization: If society is indifferent between prospect u and prospect v, but some
individuals strictly prefer u to v and some other individuals strictly prefer v to u, then
any prospect that is a strictly convex combination of u and v should be strictly preferred
to u. They also introduce an axiom of mixture symmetry, which prescribes that if
society is indifferent between two prospects, then any mixture is socially indifferent
to its symmetric counterpart. Under ex ante Pareto and an expected utility requirement
on individual preferences, Epstein and Segal derive a quadratic social welfare criterion.
Our approach differs from that of Epstein and Segal because for us ex post inequalities
also matter.
In an effort to reconcile ex ante and ex post approaches to inequality under uncer-
tainty, Ben-Porath et al. (1997) suggest considering a linear combination of the two
approaches, specifically, a linear combination of the expected Gini index and the Gini
index of expected income. Indeed, by assuming that society conforms to the MEU the-
ory, they characterize a wide class of min-of-means social welfare functions, which
include the Gini social welfare function, minimal income and average income as par-
ticular cases. Gajdos and Maurin (2004) extend the idea of Ben-Porath et al. (1997)
to any functional that is increasing in both individuals’ expected income and equal-
ity measurements by making significant additions to Ben-Porath et al.’s (1997) set
of axioms. To avoid the impossibility result of Mongin (1995), they impose a weak-
ening of the standard Pareto criterion, which prescribes that society should endorse
unanimity when it holds both ex ante and ex post.
The contributions of Ben-Porath et al. (1997) and Gajdos and Maurin (2004) are
able to capture both ex ante and ex post equality considerations in the evaluation of
income distributions under uncertainty. However, this feature exposes their results to
the criticisms that are typically made against each of the approaches, specifically, the
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violation of ex ante Pareto in the ex post approach and the violation of state-wise
dominance in the ex ante approach. On this basis, and following the ex post approach
proposed by Hammond (1983) and Broome (1991), Fleurbaey (2010) proposes, in the
context of risk, a social welfare criterion that behaves as an ex ante criterion in cases
where risk generates no inequalities, as an ex post criterion in cases where the final
allocation of utilities to individuals is known ex ante; otherwise, the social welfare
criterion is a smooth combination of the two approaches to equality. It is worth noting
that, though the proposed welfare criterion violates ex ante Pareto, it satisfies both
ex ante Pareto and ex ante equality in cases where both prospects are either riskless
(that is, when each individual obtains the same units of utility, independent of the state
of nature) or egalitarian (that is, when individuals obtain the same units of utility in
each realized state of nature). However, since this criterion retains a strong form of
consequentialism, it has left open the issue of ex ante equality in lotteries. Fleurbaey
(2015) extend Fleurbaey’s (2010) analysis to a framework that allows for ex ante
equality considerations to play a role in the ex post evaluation.8
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 presents the
theoretical framework and outlines the main axioms, whereas the restrictiveness of
the weak separability conditions is presented by means of examples in Sect. 3. Section 4
presents our representation theorems, whereas Sect. 5 analyzes the consequences of
Collective ex ante Pareto, as well as those of ex ante Pareto, for our classes of social
welfare criteria. Sect. 6 concludes.
2 The theoretical framework and background
2.1 The framework
We denote the set of (mutually exclusive) states of nature by S and an individual state
by s ∈ S. We assume here that the cardinality of S, denoted by |S|, is finite with
|S| ≥ 2. As usual, (S) is the set of probability vectors on S, and ◦ (S) is the set of
strictly positive probability vectors. We also assume that individuals belong to a finite
set I with |I| ≥ 2 and that individual i(∈ I) and society face uncertain prospects. Let
(I) be the set of probability vectors on I, and let ◦ (I) be the set of strictly positive
probability vectors. A typical element of (I) is denoted by α = (αi )i∈I , where the
weight αi can be viewed as the degree of confidence the society has in individual i .
Throughout the paper, it will be assumed that individuals’ risk preferences are fixed
and known, whereas individuals’ beliefs may vary.
We think of social prospects in the usual way, as functions from states to social
consequences, where each social consequence is directly expressed in terms of indi-
viduals’ utility values, which conceptually amounts to endorsing the questionable
thesis of welfarism, that is, that individual utility values summarize all the infor-
mation required to derive social evaluations. Social prospects are, thus, matrices
8 In a model where income distributions are uncertain, Miyagishima (2016) characterizes a maximin social
criterion by means of a set of axioms. The value of a prospect is based on the minimum value of individuals’
certainty equivalences. A similar result can be found in Fleurbaey and Zuber (2017, proposition 4).
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u = [uis]i∈I,s∈S ∈ R|I|×|S|, with uis denoting the utility attained by individual
i in state s. We write ui = [uis]s∈S ∈ R|S| for the i th row vector of the social
prospect u, whereas we write us = [uis]i∈I ∈ R|I| for the s th column vector
of u. The social prospect u−i is obtained from u by omitting the i th row vec-
tor, that is, u−i =
(
u1, . . . , ui−1, ui+1, . . . , u|I|
)
, and we identify (ui , u−i ) with u.
Likewise, u−s is obtained from u by omitting the sth column vector, that is, u−s
= (u1, . . . , us−1, us+1, . . . , u|S|
)
, and we identify (us, u−s) with u. The utility val-
ues are assumed to be fully measurable, interpersonally comparable and adjusted for
risk. Matrix/vector inequalities are denoted by ≥, > and .9
Society’s problem is in how to rank social prospects u in R|I|×|S|. Since individuals’
risk preferences are fixed and known, the only information that matters in aggregation
is individuals’ beliefs. Therefore, given a profile of beliefs p = (pi )i∈I ∈ ( (S))|I|,
the ex ante social preference (at p) is denoted by p0 ⊆ R|I|×|S| × R|I|×|S|. The rela-
tions p0 and ∼p0 are defined as the asymmetric and symmetric parts of p0 , as usual.
Throughout, we take each p0 to be a continuous weak order (that is, a continuous,
complete and transitive binary relation).10 The statement u p0 v means that soci-
ety/social observer judges u to be at least as good as v. The statement u p0 v means
that society judges u better than v. Finally, the statement u ∼p v means that society
judges u and v as equally good.
2.2 The theoretical background
We present some basic axioms for the social preference p0 that will be used in the
sequel. For a given profile of beliefs p and for any two social prospects u and v:
A.1. Individual-wise separability (I -separability, for short):
For all i ∈ I, (ui , u−i ) p0 (vi , u−i ) ⇐⇒ (ui , v−i ) p0 (vi , v−i ) .
A.2. State-wise separability (S -separability, for short):
For all s ∈ S, (us, u−s) p0 (vs, u−s) ⇐⇒ (us, v−s) p0 (vs, v−s) .
A.3. Monotonicity:
(a) u ≥ v ⇒ u p0 v.
(b) u > v ⇒ u p0 v.
Throughout the paper, we will say that the social preference 0 satisfies an axiom if
p0 satisfies that axiom for every p ∈ ( (S))|I|.
9 We use the following matrix/vector inequalities: for all u, v ∈ R|I|×|S|, u ≥ v if uis ≥ yis for all i and
all s; u > v if u ≥ v and uis > vis for some i and some s; and u  v if uis > yis for all i and all s.
10 The social preference p0 is continuous on R
|I|×|S| if for every u, the sets {v|u  v} and {v|v  u}
are open. Here, we refer to the standard topology on R|I|×|S|. Therefore, the condition is identical to the
continuity of consumer preferences in Debreu (1960).
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All of the above axioms are quite common. The I-separability axiom and the
S-separability axiom are the familiar principles of weak separability.11 Then, if
(ui , u−i ) p0 (vi , u−i ), this means that individual i’s prospect ui is socially pre-
ferred (at p) to the prospect vi when the full prospect is filled out with u−i . When we
compare the prospect (ui , v−i ) with (vi , v−i ), we are changing how we fill out the
full prospect, but we are still comparing the same two individual i’s prospects. The
I-separability axiom, A.1, says that the social ranking of (ui , u−i ) and (vi , u−i ) does
not change with the filling-out. It says more besides: The same property holds for each
individual i in society and each pair of i’s prospects.
The S-separability axiom, A.2, instead says that the social ranking between two
prospects, (us, u−s) and (vs, u−s), should only depend on the values for which they
differ. Indeed, if the state s does not occur, the two prospects result in the exact same
allocation u−s . Then, when a society compares (us, u−s) and (vs, u−s), it can focus
on what happens in state s, and ignore the other states.
The monotonicity axiom, A.3, prescribes that society should prefer more to less,
no matter at which states the higher payoffs are offered. Note that part (b) prescribes
that if u is larger than v for some entries and is no less for any other, then u is better
than v.
Next, let us define two welfare orderings induced by p0 . They are 
p
i for individual
i and p,s0 for society in state s. While 
p
i makes ex ante comparisons, 
p,s
0 makes ex
post comparisons. We obtain these orderings by restricting the social preference p0
to prospects that vary along the component of interest.
Definition 1 Suppose that the social preference p0 satisfies the I-separability axiom.
For each i ∈ I, define the following individual i’s ex ante welfare ordering pi :
ui pi vi ⇐⇒ there are u, v ∈ R|I|×|S| such that u−i = v−i and u p0 v.
Definition 2 Suppose that the social preference p0 satisfies the S-separability axiom.
For each s ∈ S, define the following ex post social welfare ordering in state s, p,s0 :
us p,s0 vs ⇐⇒ there are u, v ∈ R|I|×|S| such that u−s = v−s and u p0 v.
Note that pi and 
p,s
0 are continuous weak orders; thus, they are representable
by continuous real-valued functions. Before stating the consequence of imposing the
above weak separability conditions on the social preference, three comments are in
order:
Remark 1 One can show that if the social preference satisfies I-separability, then it
satisfies the following conditions: (a) Ex ante welfare ordering indifference: if ui and
vi are equally good according to individual i’s ex ante welfare ordering and this holds
for every individual i (that is, ui ∼pi vi for all i ∈ I), then society should respect
this and judge those prospects as equally good (that is, u ∼p0 v); (b) Ex ante welfare
11 In multi-attribute decision theory, see Keeney and Raiffa (1993; Ch. 3). In individual decision theory,
see Fishburn (1970) and Wakker (1989).
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ordering monotonicity: if individual i’s ex ante welfare ordering ranks ui above vi and
this holds for every individual i and if for at least one individual j it holds that u j is
better than v j (that is, ui pi vi for all i ∈ I and u j pj v j for some j ∈ I), then the
society should respect this and judge u better than v (that is, u p0 v).
Remark 2 One can show that S-separability, combined with Definition 2, implies that
social preference is increasing with respect to each of its ex post welfare ordering.
This is the common state-wise dominance condition, which is considerably weaker
than the sure-thing principle—P2 in Savage’s system. In individual decision theory,
the state-wise dominance condition is regarded as a fundamental tenet for decision
making under uncertainty and many non-expected utility models (including the rank-
dependent utility model) satisfy it.
Remark 3 One can also show that if the social preference satisfies S-separability, then
it satisfies the ex post social welfare ordering indifference condition as well as the ex
post social welfare ordering monotonicity condition.12
The consequence of imposing the I-separability axiom, the S-separability axiom
and monotonicity is that the social preferences can be represented, for every profile p
of beliefs, in the additive form
u p0 v ⇐⇒
∑
i∈I
∑
s∈S
φis (uis |p) ≥
∑
i∈I
∑
s∈S
φis (vis |p) , for all u, v ∈ R|I|×|S|,
where {φis (·|p)}i∈I,s∈S is a family of continuous, increasing and real-valued func-
tions (see Aczel and Maksa 1996; Mongin and Pivato 2015; Zuber 2016). The
significance of this representation theorem for us is that the weak separability con-
ditions imply the so-called strong separability condition, which is the most useful
necessary and sufficient condition for (social) preferences to be additively separable
(see, for instance, Debreu 1960; Fishburn 1970). In other words, we have strong sep-
arability when we have weak separability not only for each individual member of the
society I and each individual state of the set S but also for all subsets formed out of
the Cartesian product of those sets. More formally, the strong separability condition
states that for any subset K of the space I × S, the social preference is separable on
the set K and on its complement KC .
Group-Event-wise separability (GE-separability, for short):
For all K ⊂ I×S, (uK, uKC
)
p0
(
vK, uKC
) ⇐⇒ (uK, vKC
)
p0
(
vK, vKC
)
.
12 Formally, the conditions can be stated as follows: For a given profile of beliefs p and for any two social
prospects u and v:
Ex post social welfare ordering indifference:
us ∼p,s0 vs for all s ∈ S ⇒ u ∼p0 v.
Ex post social welfare ordering monotonicity:
us p,s0 vs for all s ∈ S and ut p,t0 vt for some t ∈ S ⇒ u p0 v.
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To be clear, GE-separability implies the following separability conditions.
Group-wise separability (G-separability, for short):
For all G ⊂ I, (uG, uGC
)
p0
(
vG, uGC
) ⇐⇒ (uG, vGC
)
p0
(
vG, vGC
)
.
Event-wise separability (E-separability, for short):
For all E ⊂ S , (uE , uEC
)
p0
(
vE , uEC
) ⇐⇒ (uE , vEC
)
p0
(
vE , vEC
)
.
3 The restrictiveness of strong separability
This section presents, by means of examples, various challenges that the GE-
separability axiom poses in the context of social decisions under uncertainty.13
Example 1 First, the E-separability axiom (or the sure-thing principle) is known to be
problematic, even in the context of objective risk. In a seminal note, Diamond (1967)
argues against the sure-thing principle, contending that, if the society aims to give
equal chances to individuals, the social preference should not be subjected to it. The
following example illustrates the point.
There are two equally probable states of nature s1 and s2, and two alternative
prospects u and v that a social observer may take. Let us say that the society consists
of Amy and Bob, two equally deserving people. Let us then assume that the social
observer is symmetric in its treatment of individuals. If prospect u is chosen, there is
a probability of 1/2 that Amy will have one unit of utility, while Bob will have none;
there is also a probability of 1/2 that Amy and Bob will have zero units of utility. With
prospect v, it is certain that Amy will have zero units of utility, while there is a proba-
bility of 1/2 that Bob will have one unit of utility. In tabular form, we have (Table 1):
An impartial social observer would judge the prospects u and v as equally good (that
is, u ∼0 v) because the prospects seem very much the same, except the substitution
of the name tags Amy and Bob.
Next, let us consider two alternative prospects, u′ and v′, where u′ (resp., v′) is
obtained by replacing the second column of u (resp., v) with an allocation of utilities
that assigns one unit of utility to Amy and none to Bob. In tabular form, we have
(Table 2):
Thus, if prospect u′ is chosen, it is certain that Amy will have one unit of utility, while
Bob will have none. With prospect v′, there is a probability of 1/2 that Amy will have
one unit of utility and Bob none, while there is a probability of 1/2 that Amy will have
none and Bob will have one unit of utility. According to the E-separability axiom, an
impartial social observer needs to judge the new prospects u′ and v′ as equally good
(that is, u′ ∼0 v′). However, it seems reasonable to judge prospect v′ better than u′
since the prospect u′ discriminates against Bob, while prospect v′ “gives B(ob) a fair
shake”, as Diamond (1967; p. 766) puts it.
13 There is a classic stock of arguments for rejecting strong separability in other contexts. See, for instance,
Gorman (1968).
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Table 1 Example 1, First case Prospect u Prospect v
States of nature States of nature
Agents s1 s2 Agents s1 s2
Amy 1 0 Amy 0 0
Bob 0 0 Bob 1 0
Table 2 Example 1, Second
case
Prospect u′ Prospect v′
States of nature States of nature
Agents s1 s2 Agents s1 s2
Amy 1 1 Amy 0 1
Bob 0 0 Bob 1 0
Example 2 As a second example, let us consider again a society composed of two
identical individuals, Amy and Bob, facing a choice between two alternative prospects,
u and v, with two possible and equally probable states of nature, s1 and s2. Let us also
assume that the social observer is symmetric in its treatment of the two individuals.
The table below shows what results the prospects would have in the different states of
nature (Table 3).
An impartial social observer would judge the prospects u and v as equally good because
the prospects are very much the same, except the substitution of the name tags Amy and
Bob, as well as the name tags state s1 and state s2. Let us consider now two alternative
prospects u′ andv′, where u′ (resp.,v′) is derived from prospect u (resp.,v) by assigning
one unit of utility to Amy if state s2 occurs. In tabular form, we have (Table 4):
If prospect u′ is chosen, it is certain that Amy will have one unit of utility, while Bob
will have none. With prospect v′, there is a probability of 1/2 that every member of
society will have one unit of utility, while there is a probability of 1/2 that everyone
will have zero units of utility.
Fleurbaey (2010) proposes two classes of prospects: the riskless prospects (where
each individual obtains the same units of utility, independent of the state of nature)
and the egalitarian ones (where individuals obtain the same units of utility in each
realized state of nature). According to this terminology, u′ is a riskless prospect while
v′ is an egalitarian one. Indeed, in either state, the utility distribution seems more
egalitarian in v′ than in u′, and so it seems reasonable on this basis that one ranks v′
above u′. However, it is also easy to build an argument in favor of prospect u′ against
prospect v′ on the basis of “social safety”.14 Indeed, u′ is “socially riskless” in the
sense that Amy will survive any natural disaster or terrorist attack, whereas v′ is a
“socially risky” prospect, because there is a probability of 1/2 that the entire society
will become extinct. We should be able to rank freely the prospects u′ and v′, depending
14 Keeney (1980) and Fishburn (1984) use the notion of “catastrophe avoidance”.
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Table 3 Example 2, First case Prospect u Prospect v
States of nature States of nature
Agents s1 s2 Agents s1 s2
Amy 1 0 Amy 0 0
Bob 0 0 Bob 0 1
Table 4 Example 2, Second
case
Prospect u′ Prospect v′
States of nature States of nature
Agents s1 s2 Agents s1 s2
Amy 1 1 Amy 0 1
Bob 0 0 Bob 0 1
on which social aspect we believe is more important. But the GE-separability axiom
would make us view the prospects u′ and v′ as equally good.
Example 3 As a final example, we show that even the I-separability axiom may be
problematic. To illustrate this point, let us consider again a society composed of two
identical individuals, Amy and Bob, facing a choice between two alternative prospects,
u and v, with two possible and equally probable states of nature, s1 and s2. Let us also
assume that the social observer is symmetric in its treatment of the two individuals.
The table below shows what results the prospects would have in the different states of
nature (Table 5).
An impartial social observer would judge the prospects u and v as equally good because
the prospects seem very much the same, except the substitution of the name tags state
s1 and state s2. Also, let us consider two alternative prospects, u′ and v′, where u′
(resp., v′) is derived from prospect u (resp., v ) by assigning one unit of utility to Bob
if state s2 occurs. In tabular form, we have:
With prospect u′, there is a probability of 1/2 that Amy will have one unit of utility and
Bob none, while there is a probability of 1/2 that Bob will have one unit of utility and
Amy none. If prospect v′ is chosen, there is a probability of 1/2 that every member of
society will have one unit of utility, while there is a probability of 1/2 that everyone
will have zero units of utility.
In terms of expected utility, both prospects distribute expected utilities equally, and
this would make a social observer ex ante indifferent between them—since Amy/Bob
has an expected value of 1/2. However, u′ leads to an unequal ex post distribution of
utilities, while v′ leads to an equal ex post distribution of utilities. Thus, in either state,
the utility distribution is more egalitarian in v′ than in u′, which may make one rank
v′ above u′. However, on the basis of “social safety”, an opposite conclusion can be
supported. Indeed, u′ is “socially riskless” in the sense that either Amy or Bob will
survive any natural disaster, whereas v′ is a “socially risky” prospect because there is a
probability of 1/2 that the entire society will become extinct. Again, we should be able
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Table 5 Example 3, First case Prospect u Prospect v
States of nature States of nature
Agents s1 s2 Agents s1 s2
Amy 1 0 Amy 0 1
Bob 0 0 Bob 0 0
Table 6 Example 3, Second
case
Prospect u′ Prospect v′
States of nature States of nature
Agents s1 s2 Agents s1 s2
Amy 1 0 Amy 0 1
Bob 0 1 Bob 0 1
to rank freely the prospects u′ and v′, depending on which aspect we believe is more
important. But the I-separability axiom would make us view the prospects u′ and v′ as
equally good and would prevent us from making any social evaluation of the prospects.
4 Accepting the difference in orders
The preceding examples suggest that the I-separability axiom and the S-separability
axiom are (too) restrictive for a social observer who has, for instance, equality con-
cerns. However, the weak decision-theoretic conditions that lead to the additively
separable representation of social preferences give rise to another disturbing result:
The compatibility between the ex ante Pareto principle and the ex post Pareto principle
can be achieved only if (1) the individuals and the planner follow the SEU axioms
(Savage 1972) and (2) they have the same subjective beliefs (Mongin and Pivato 2015).
This is a very stringent conclusion. Indeed, in contrast to classic impossibility
results (Harsanyi 1955; Mongin 1995), where it is assumed that individuals and the
social observer are expected utility maximizers, we now know that expected utility
theory belongs to the conclusions and that the utilitarian-type representation of social
preferences basically comes from the weak separability conditions. The classic impos-
sibility results can thus be viewed as a clash between the I-separability axiom and
the S-separability axiom. This sounds like a disaster for welfare economics, because
these separability conditions are fundamental to (applied) economics.
To escape that negative conclusion, a first rescue move is to explore the conse-
quences of dropping separability altogether. This can be done in a number of conceptual
frameworks, given that there are several normatively compelling criteria that one
may impose on the individuals and the social observer.15 Throughout the rest of the
15 It is already widely known that one way to evade Mongin’s (1995) impossibility result is to enlarge the
preference domain for society, as shown by Mongin (1998) and Chambers and Hayashi (2006). Specifically,
they allow the society to have state-dependent preferences (while remaining in the subjective utility class).
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paper, we posit that individuals follow the SEU axioms (Savage 1972; Anscombe and
Aumann 1963). We make this assumption because the key issue here is that society
may not satisfy those axioms, even though individuals are SEU maximizers. More-
over, we borrow from decision theory the following well-known axioms: For a given
profile of beliefs p and for any two prospects u and v:
A.4. Homogeneity:
For all α > 0, u p0 v ⇒ αu p0 αv.
A.5. Certainty-Equality Independence (CE-Independence, for short):
For all α ∈ R, u p0 v ⇒ u + α1I×S p0 v + α1I×S ,
where 1I×S is a matrix of size |I| by |S| with 1’s in all its entries.
A.6. Uncertainty-Inequality Aversion (UI-Aversion, for short):
For all α ∈ (0, 1) , u ∼p0 v ⇒ αu + (1 − α) v p0 u.
These are mild but not completely innocuous conditions for social rationality.
Let us briefly describe their content. Homogeneity, A.4, is the well-known axiom
of invariance of the social ranking under common changes of utility scales. Similarly,
CE-Independence, A.5, requires the invariance of the social ranking under common
changes of utility levels. UI-Aversion, A.6, says that any mixing between two equally
good prospects brings social improvement. Thus, it requires that the social observer
have a preference for mixing.
Whether one can find the rescue move of dropping separability compelling or not,
its well-known consequence within the behavioral tradition of Savage (1972) and
Anscombe and Aumann (1963) can be stated as follows:
Lemma 1 Suppose that individuals are SEU maximizers. Suppose that the set of
beliefs over S for individual i is ◦ (S). The continuous weak order 0 over R|I|×|S|
satisfies Monotonicity (A.3), Homogeneity ( A.4), CE-Independence (A.5) and UI-
Aversion (A.6) if and only if for every profile of beliefs p = (pi )i∈I there exists
a unique, closed and convex set of strictly positive probability vectors on I × S,
(p) ⊆ ◦ (I × S), such that
u p0 v ⇐⇒ min
λ∈(p)
(
∑
i∈I
∑
s∈S
λisuis
)
≥ min
λ∈(p)
(
∑
i∈I
∑
s∈S
λisvis
)
, for all u, v ∈ R|I|×|S|.
Proof Let the premises hold. The ‘if’ part can be checked easily. The ‘only if’ part
follows from Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989; pp. 145–149) by taking the product I ×S
as the “state space”. unionsq
Lemma 1 characterizes a criterion for decision making that is quite similar in spirit to
that of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Like the MEU model of Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989), the welfare criterion of Lemma 1 enjoys the appeal of simplicity. However,
the set (p) of beliefs, in comparison, may depend on individuals’ beliefs.
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Indeed, in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)’s utility model, the decision maker has
a subjective set of beliefs and evaluates any prospect by computing its minimum
expected value over that set. A distinctive feature of that model is that the set of
beliefs is totally subjective. The intuition for this is that when the decision maker
has limited or no information about the probability measure that actually governs
the phenomenon he observes, the decision maker may consider a range of possible
probabilities.
In Lemma 1, the range of probabilities used to compute the minimum possible value
of expected utility may be related to the beliefs of individuals. Indeed, the set (p)
could include, as relevant ‘items’, probability distributions that are plausible/possible
according to individuals’ factual or logical knowledge. Of course, the social observer
does not commit to those items and use reasons in (p) to make his preference
judgement. However, since individuals’ beliefs can provide the social observer with
reasons for his own preference ranking, the above representation theorem may be
viewed as an attempt to encompass judgments of how and how much individuals are
responsible for their beliefs. Natural candidates for the set (p) and their dependence
on individuals’ beliefs are characterized and discussed in Sect. 5.
Also, the probability distributions in the set (p) can be interpreted as social
welfare weights. From this viewpoint, the social welfare criterion of Lemma 1 is a
weighted sum of individuals’ utilities, where for any prospect the weights that give
the lowest possible utility sum are used. Thus, this criterion gives the worst-off indi-
viduals greater weights than the better-off. Moreover, the larger the size of the set
(p), the greater the weight placed on worst-off individuals. This produces a range
of social welfare criteria that depends on the set (p). Since this range encompasses
the utilitarian and the Rawlsian criteria as limit points, the social welfare criterion of
Lemma 1 can be viewed as a compromise between those “extreme” criteria, and so it
may be prima facie considered suitable for making consistent social judgements that
address concerns about inequality within the context of uncertainty.
Ex ante form representation theorem
However, this may be wrong since one can clearly obtain sharper and more meaningful
representation theorems for social preferences. Indeed, if at this point one insists on
the ex ante individual well-being by making the additional assumption that the social
ranking between (ui , u−i ) and (vi , u−i ) should not change with filling-out, he would
arrive at the following ex ante form representation theorem of the social preference
ranking.
Theorem 1 Under the assumptions of Lemma 1, the continuous weak order 0 over
R
|I|×|S| satisfies I-separability (A.1) if and only if for every profile of beliefs p =
(pi )i∈I there exist a unique, closed and convex set of vectors of strictly positive welfare
weights on I, I (p) ⊆ ◦ (I), and a unique family of closed and convex sets of strictly
positive probability vectors on S, Si (p) ⊆ ◦ (S) for each i ∈ I, such that, for all
u, v ∈ R|I|×|S|,
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u p0 v ⇐⇒ min
α∈I (p)
∑
i∈I
αi
(
min
σi ∈Si (p)
∑
s∈S
σisuis
)
≥ min
α∈I (p)
∑
i∈I
αi
(
min
σi ∈Si (p)
∑
s∈S
σisvis
)
. (1)
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
In other words, with the addition of the I-separability axiom to Lemma 1, we can
find a set of welfare weights, I (p), as well as a set of probabilities, Si (p), for every
individual i . To find the evaluation of a prospect u, we need first to compute the ex
ante individual i’s expected utility of u with respect to the worst probability in the
set Si (p), and then compute the minimal weighted average of these data by using the
welfare weight vectors in I (p). We interpret the set I (p) of weights as the attitude
toward inequality that the social observer may have. By contrast, we view the set Si (p)
as the set of recommendations made by the observer to individual i on what set of
probabilities individual i needs to base the computation of her own expected utility:
Individual i behaves as if any probability distribution that the social observer deems
possible is indeed possible.
Note that the observer’s recommendations can vary from one individual to another.
Therefore, Si (p) reflects the social observer’s degree of paternalism and his attitude
toward uncertainty. The stronger the degree of paternalism, the less Si (p) may reflect
individual i’s own beliefs. One could argue that this is not in the spirit of ex ante
solutions, which amount to accepting the individuals’ beliefs for better or worse.
However, our interpretation of Theorem 1 is as follows: It describes the maximal
possible flexibility of recommendations that the oberver can make. Of course, this
does not mean that one should be content with any type of recommendation. How
the set of recommendations made by the observer to individual i should depend on
individual i’s belief is analyzed in Proposition 3 and Theorem 3, where two alternative
Pareto-type axioms are considered.
Ex post form representation theorem
Rather than insisting on the ex ante individual well-being, one could favor the ex
post individual well-being by requiring the S-separability axiom. In this case, one
would arrive instead at the following ex post form representation theorem for social
preference.
Theorem 2 Under the assumptions of Lemma 1, the continuous weak order 0 over
R
|I|×|S| satisfies S-separability (A.2) if and only if for every profile of beliefs p =
(pi )i∈I there exist a unique, closed and convex set of strictly positive probability
vectors on S, S (p) ⊆ ◦ (S), and a unique family of closed, convex and state-
dependent sets of vectors of strictly positive welfare weights on I, Is (p) ⊆ ◦ (I)
for each s ∈ S, such that, for all u, v ∈ R|I|×|S|,
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u p0 v ⇐⇒ min
σ∈S(p)
∑
s∈S
σs
(
min
αs∈Is (p)
∑
i∈I
αsi uis
)
≥ min
σ∈S(p)
∑
s∈S
σs
(
min
αs∈Is (p)
∑
i∈I
αsivis
)
. (2)
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
In other words, with the addition of the S-separability axiom to Lemma 1, we can
find instead a set of state-dependent welfare weights, Is (p), as well as a set of social
beliefs, S (p). To find the evaluation of a prospect u, we need first to compute the
worst weighted sum of individuals’ utilities in each state s by using the weight vectors
in Is(p) and then compute the expected value of these data with respect to each belief
in S (p) and pick the smallest one.
Though the social observer’s preference ranking of Theorem 2 violates the even-
twise monotonicity principle—that is, P3 in Savage’s system—it is legitimate to
interpret elements of S(p) as social beliefs.16 The reason is that in our framework
the cardinal utilities of individuals are fixed, and so the state dependence of the social
preference is only about the relative weights of cardinal utilities. This allows us to
escape the problem of utility scaling. Note that the larger the size of the set S (p),
the greater the degree of uncertainty aversion of the observer. Also, we interpret the
state-dependent set Is (p) as the social observer’s attitude toward inequality in state s.
The above characterization is related to the Multidimensional Generalized Gini
criteria axiomatized by Gajdos and Weymark (2005; Theorem 5). Indeed, Gajdos and
Weymark (2005) actually provide more general representations because they only use
an homogeneity axiom or a translatability axiom (similar to CE-Independence).
4.1 Comparative inequality/uncertainty aversion
The remainder of this section is devoted to the concepts of comparative inequality and
uncertainty aversion, as well as the consequences for the sets of probability distribu-
tions that appear in the above representation theorems.
In the present framework, definitions of comparative inequality aversion are as
follows.
Definition 3 For a given profile of beliefs p :
(a) The social preference p0 is more ex ante inequality averse than the social prefer-
ence ∗p0 if for all c ∈ R and all u ∈ R|I|×|S| such that, for each i ∈ I, uis = uit for
all s, t ∈ S,
c1I×S ∗p0 u ⇒ c1I×S p0 u;
16 Indeed, when P3 is violated, one is not entitled to consider probability distributions as being subjective
probabilities. On this point, see Mongin (1995, 1998) and Chambers and Hayashi (2006).
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(b) The ex post welfare ordering p,s0 is more ex post inequality averse than the ex
post welfare ordering ∗p,s0 if for all c ∈ R and all us ∈ R|I|,
c1I ∗p,s0 us ⇒ c1I p,s0 us ;
where 1I ∈ R|I| denotes the |I|-dimensional vector whose entries are all 1 and
1I×S ∈ R|I|×|S| denotes the |I| × |S|-dimensional matrix whose entries are all 1.
The interpretation of part (a) of this definition is that if a less ex ante inequality
averse social observer prefers the egalitarian prospect c1I×S , where all individuals
obtain the same unit c of utility across states, to a more unequal distribution of utilities
u, where utilities can vary across individuals, so does the more ex ante inequality
averse social observer. Similarly, the interpretation of part (b) is that if a less ex post
inequality averse social observer prefers the egalitarian distribution c1I to a more
unequal distribution us so does the more ex post inequality averse social observer.
The next result provides a characterization of the notion of comparative inequality
aversion in terms of a simple relation between sets of probability distributions. Let
us denote by I ∗ (p) the set of welfare weights induced by the social preference ∗p0
under the requirements of Theorem 1, and by I ∗s (p) the state-dependent set of weight
vectors induced by the social preference ∗p0 under the requirements of Theorem 2.
Therefore:
Proposition 1 For a given profile of beliefs p :
(a) Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, the social preference p0 is more ex ante
inequality averse than the social preference ∗p0 if and only if I ∗ (p) ⊆ I (p).
(b) Under the assumptions of Theorem 2, the ex post welfare ordering p,s0 is more ex
post inequality averse at state s than the ex post welfare ordering ∗p,s0 if and only if
I ∗s (p) ⊆ Is (p).
Proof The statements obviously hold; thus, the proof is omitted. unionsq
Comparative uncertainty aversion can be defined as follows.
Definition 4 For a given profile of beliefs p :
(a) The ex ante welfare ordering pi is more uncertainty averse for individual i than
the ex ante welfare ordering ∗pi if for all c ∈ R and all ui ∈ R|S|
c1S ∗pi ui ⇒ c1S pi ui ;
(b) The social preference p0 is more socially uncertainty averse than the social pref-
erence ∗p0 if for all c ∈ R and all u ∈ R|I|×|S| such that, for each s ∈ S, uis = u js
for all i, j ∈ I,
c1I×S ∗p0 u ⇒ c1I×S p0 u;
where 1S ∈ R|S| denotes the |S|-dimensional vector whose entries are all 1.
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In other words, part (a) of the definition says that the ex ante welfare ordering
pi is more uncertainty averse than the ex ante welfare ordering 
∗p
i , if, whenever
∗pi prefers the constant prospect c1S to an uncertain prospect ui , then the same is
true for pi . Similarly, part (b) says that if a less socially uncertainty averse social
observer prefers the sure prospect c1I×S to a more uncertain prospect u, where in
state s individuals obtain the same level of utility, so does the more socially uncertainty
averse social observer.
The next proposition shows that comparative uncertainty attitudes are characterized
by a simple relation between sets of probability distributions. To this end, let us denote
by S∗i (p) the individual i’s set of probability measures induced by the social prefer-
ence ∗p0 under the requirements of Theorem 1, and by S∗ (p) the set of probability
distributions induced by the social preference ∗p0 under the requirements of Theorem
2. Therefore:
Proposition 2 For a given profile of beliefs p :
(a) Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, the ex ante welfare ordering pi is more
uncertainty averse for individual i than the ex ante welfare ordering ∗pi if and only
if S∗i (p) ⊆ Si (p).
(b) Under the assumptions of Theorem 2, the social preference p0 is more socially
uncertainty averse than the social preference ∗p0 if and only if S∗ (p) ⊆ S (p).
Proof The statements obviously hold; thus, the proof is omitted. unionsq
Although it is clear why S (p) and Si (p) should depend on the profile p, their
dependence is characterized in the next section. However, one may wonder why I (p)
or Is (p) should depend on p. In the next section, we show that even if there is no
inequality concern, ex ante Pareto implies that ex post welfare weights Is (p) must
depend on p. For example, if individual A believes that it will be sunny and individual
B believe that it will be rainy, then A’s welfare weight will be larger than B’s welfare
weight when it is sunny, whereas B’s welfare weight will be larger than A’s welfare
weight when it is rainy. Furthermore, under the current scope of the paper, we put no
restrictions on the dependence of inequality aversion on belief profile. This is to allow
a maximal flexibility of degree of inequality aversion for the society. One may give,
however, an informal argument on how much the society should be inequality averse
when individuals have more diverse beliefs.
5 How can each approach deal with disagreements in beliefs?
5.1 Ex ante Pareto principle
In this subsection, we analyze the implications of the ex ante variant of the (strong)
Pareto principle for the preceding MaxMinMin representation theorems.
The principle requires that if individuals have the same preference judgment
between two prospects, this judgment needs to be compelling for the social observer.
More technically, this variant has two parts: (a) Pareto indifference: if every individual
judges two social prospects as equally good, then the social observer should respect
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this and judge those prospects as equally good; (b) strict Pareto: if every individual i
judges ui to be at least as good as vi , and at least one of them judges u j to be better than
v j , then the social observer should respect this and judge u as better than v. In terms
of individuals’ utilities and their beliefs, the ex ante Pareto principle can be stated as
follows: For a given profile of beliefs p and for any two social prospects u and v:
A.7. Ex ante Pareto:
pi ui ≥ pivi for all i ∈ I ⇒ u p0 v.
A.8. Ex ante strict Pareto:
pi ui ≥ pivi for all i ∈ I and p j u j > p jv j for some j ∈ I ⇒u p0 v.
The axiom of ex ante Pareto states that if every individual i judges ui to be at least
as good as vi according to her own expected utility calculation (that is, pi ui ≥ pivi ),
the social observer should judge the social prospect u to be at least as good as v. On the
other hand, the axiom of ex ante strict Pareto requires that the social observer should
judge u to be better than v if every individual i judges ui to be at least as good as vi ,
according to her own expected utility calculation (that is, pi ui ≥ pivi ), and at least
one individual j judges u j to be better than v j (that is, p j u j > p jv j ).
A first consequence of the ex ante Pareto principle is that the social observer prefers
(weakly) more to less, no matter at which states the higher payoffs are offered. More
importantly, it implies that the social observer’s ranking of prospects that differs only
in what individual i obtains does not change with filling-out.
Lemma 2 Let p be a profile of beliefs. Then, the social preference p0 satisfies Mono-
tonicity and I-separability if it satisfies ex ante Pareto (A.7) as well as ex ante strict
Pareto (A.8).
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
A second important consequence is that the social observer can no longer take into
account ambiguity/uncertainty considerations in his own preference ranking of the
prospects. The reason is that the social observer is forced to take individuals’ ex ante
expected utility calculations as primitives for the evaluation of social prospects. There-
fore, and in contrast to the evaluation formula of Theorem 1, the social preference and
individuals’ preferences are related by a min-of-means formula: The social observer’s
evaluation of a prospect is the minimal weighted sum, over all weight allocations in
I (p), of individuals’ ex ante expected utility. This consequence is formalized in the
theorem below.
Proposition 3 Under the assumptions of Lemma 1, the continuous weak order 0
over R|I|×|S| satisfies ex ante Pareto (A.7) and ex ante strict Pareto (A.8) if and only
if for every profile of beliefs p = (pi )i∈I the continuous weak order 0 has the ex
ante representation form of Theorem 1 where
Si (p) = {pi } for all i ∈ I. (3)
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Proof See Appendix. unionsq
Thus, under ex ante Pareto, individual i’s set of recommendations, Si (p), depends
uniquely on his belief, meaning that the observer has to accept individual i’s belief
for better or worse, and that no correction is required. The consequence is to consider
weaker variants of the ex ante Pareto if we want to correct individuals’ beliefs. This
will be the subject of the next subsection.
When the ex ante Pareto principle is combined with the S-separability axiom, we
go back to Harsanyi’s Theorem because the social preference over prospects has a
weighted utilitarian-type representation, where weights are inferred from considering
individuals’ own beliefs. This stringent conclusion can be stated as follows.
Proposition 4 Under the assumptions of Lemma 1, the continuous weak order 0 over
R
|I|×|S| satisfies S-separability (A.2), ex ante Pareto (A.7) and ex ante strict Pareto
(A.8) if and only if there exists a real-valued function β : (◦ (S))|I| → ◦ (I) such
that for every profile of beliefs p = (pi )i∈I :
(a) The continuous weak order p0 has the ex ante representation form of Theorem 1
where
I (p) = {β (p)} , and Si (p) = {pi } for all i ∈ I.
(b) The continuous weak order p0 has the ex post representation form of Theorem 2
where
S (p) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
(
∑
i∈I
βi (p) pis
)
s∈S
⎫
⎬
⎭ , and
Is (p) =
{(
βi (p) pis∑
j∈I β j (p) p js
)
i∈I
}
for all s ∈ S.
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
Note that the main culprit for this disappointing result is the ex ante Pareto principle.
Also, note that, while Proposition 3 is an ex ante solution that does not include any
ex post component, Proposition 4 is an attempt at reconciliation. In this regards, it
is worth noting that, similar to ours, the state-dependent solution recently proposed
by Mongin and Pivato (2017) also uses individual probabilities to define the ex post
weights.
5.2 Collective ex ante Pareto principle
Both Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 prove the limitations of the conventional ex
ante Pareto principle to social preferences: They exclude any mix between equality
and cautiousness from the social observer’s eyes. To take into account both inequality
considerations and caution concerns, the contribution of the subsection to literature of
social decisions under uncertainty is to consider a stronger variant of the Unanimity-
Pareto criterion suggested by Gayer et al. (2014), labeled Collective ex ante Pareto
principle, and analyze its implications for our MaxMinMin social judgements.
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To be precise, this variant is based on the idea of unanimity relative to each indi-
vidual belief: If all individuals agree that prospect u has greater expected utility than
prospect v relative to each individual belief, so should the social observer. Formally,
it can be stated as follows: For a given profile of beliefs p and for any two prospects
u and v:
A.9. Collective ex ante Pareto:
p j ui ≥ p jvi for all i, j ∈ I ⇒ u p0 v.
A.10. Collective ex ante strict Pareto:
pkui ≥ pkvi for all i ∈ I and pku j > pkv j for some j ∈ I,
for all k ∈ I ⇒ u p0 v.
The axiom of Collective ex ante Pareto states that if the expected utility of prospect
u is at least as large as the expected utility of prospect v, for each individual and for all
beliefs in p, then the social observer should respect this and judge u to be at least as
good as v (that is, u p0 v). More intuitively, if no one becomes worse off according
to all members’ beliefs when we move from v to u, then the social observer should
admit u as a collective improvement. On the other hand, the axiom of Collective ex
ante strict Pareto requires that the social observer should judge u as better than v (that
is, u p0 v) if relative to each individual belief, u gives everyone at least as high of
expected utility as v and, moreover, it gives at least one individual a strictly higher
expected utility than prospect v. It should be noted that the social preference satisfies
Monotonicity, A.3, if it satisfies the Collective ex ante Pareto principle. Moreover,
Collective ex ante strict Pareto implies the Unanimity-Pareto criterion of Gayer et al.
(2014), which prescribes that if the expected utility of prospect u is higher than the
expected utility of prospect v, for each individual, for all beliefs in p, then the social
observer should judge u to be better than v (that is, u p0 v).
Conceptually, Collective ex ante Pareto principle preserves the individualistic
assumption of the classical Pareto principle, which basically means that the social
observer is non-creative. His reasons to prefer one prospect to another are based only
on the values of individual utilities and their beliefs. Moreover, it assigns a veto power
to individuals in situations in which they suffer harm due to other individuals’ beliefs.
For this reason, it allows us to avoid cases of spurious unanimity (Mongin 2016), in
which individuals agree on their preferences over prospects even though they disagree
both on beliefs and utilities. Finally, it raises the importance played by individuals’
beliefs in providing the observer with reasons for respecting individuals’ beliefs even
though they are contradictory in situations in which no one is harmed.
Formally, our Collective ex ante Pareto principle is also quite different from the
Consensus ex ante Pareto proposed by Gilboa et al. (2004), which states that the
Pareto argument should have traction only when individuals agree on probabilities of
the relevant events—sets of states. Like our variant, this restriction is able to avoid
cases of spurious unanimity.17 However, in order for their Consensus Pareto to be
17 Though difficulties still remain in situations where individual probabilities arise from conditioning on
private information. On this point see Mongin and Pivato (2016, 2017).
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powerful enough, it is required that there is a rich class of events for which everybody
agrees on their probabilities. In the domain of rich state space, there is a class of such
events; this is virtually impossible when the state space is not a continuum, say finite.
It is important to emphasize here that Collective ex ante Pareto requires a rich outcome
space in order to be powerful.
Given a profile of beliefs p = (pi )i∈I , let
I(p) = {J ∈ 2I\{∅} : pi = p j for all i, j ∈ J }
be the partition of the set of individuals such that each element of I(p) consists of
individuals with identical beliefs. To save notation, let pJ denote the beliefs commonly
held by the members of the set J ∈ I(p).
We now show that under the hypotheses and axioms of Lemma 1, the Collective ex
ante Pareto principle is equivalent to the existence of a set 	 (p) of probability distri-
butions over the set I × I(p) such that the social observer’s evaluation of a prospect
is the minimal sum of weighted expected utilities. Given any γ ∈ ◦ (I × I(p)) ,
γi J explains the weight on individual i’s expected utility that is calculated based on
J ’s probabilistic opinion. When i ∈ J , γi J simply explains the weight on i’s expected
utility that is calculated based on his belief i . However, this calculation is based on
other individuals’ beliefs when i /∈ J . Formally:
Lemma 3 Suppose that individuals are SEU maximizers. Suppose that the set of
beliefs over S for individual i is ◦ (S). The continuous weak order 0 over R|I|×|S|
satisfies Homogeneity (A.4), CE-Independence (A.5) and UI-Aversion (A.6), and,
moreover, it also satisfies Collective ex ante Pareto (A.9) and Collective ex ante strict
Pareto (A.10) if and only if for every profile of beliefs p = (pi )i∈I there exists a
unique, closed and convex set of strictly positive probability vectors on I × I(p),
	 (p) ⊆ ◦ (I × I(p)), such that, for all u, v ∈ R|I|×|S|,
u p0 v ⇐⇒ min
γ∈	(p)
⎛
⎝
∑
i∈I
∑
J∈I(p)
γi J
∑
s∈S
pJsuis
⎞
⎠
≥ min
γ∈	(p)
⎛
⎝
∑
i∈I
∑
J∈I(p)
γi J
∑
s∈S
pJsvis
⎞
⎠
. (4)
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
It is worth noting that since the profile of beliefs p is in general an I×S matrix with
full-rank, under continuity of the social preference with respect to p we can obtain a
correspondence 	 : (◦(S))|I| → 2◦(I×I) by taking limits. Thus, we can resolve
the problem of how to count duplicate opinions.
The above representation theorem shows that social preferences of Lemma 1 have
substantial flexibility even under the Collective ex ante Pareto principle. The next
two results show the consequences of requiring some form of separability of social
evaluations.
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On the one hand, whenever one would insist on the ex ante well-being of individuals
by requiring the I-separability axiom, the social observer’s preference ranking of
Lemma 3 takes the form of the evaluation formula of Theorem 1, where each individual
i’s probability distribution over states of the set Si (p) is represented as a profile of
weighted means of the non-duplicate beliefs held by the individuals and where each
allocation of welfare weights of the set I (p) is represented as a profile of sums
where the i th component is represented by the sum of the i th row of the matrix
γ ∈ 	 (p). These weights reflect social observer’s concerns for fairness. Formally,
the consequence of positing the I-separability axiom can be stated as follows:
Theorem 3 Under the assumptions of Lemma 3, the continuous weak order 0 over
R
|I|×|S| satisfies I-separability (A.1) if and only if for every profile of beliefs p =
(pi )i∈I the continuous weak order 0 has the ex ante representation form of Theorem
1 where
I (p) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
⎛
⎝
∑
J∈I(p)
γi J
⎞
⎠
i∈I
: γ ∈ 	(p)
⎫
⎬
⎭
and
Si (p) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
⎛
⎝
∑
J∈I(p)
γi J pJs
⎞
⎠
s∈S
: γ ∈ 	(p)
⎫
⎬
⎭ for all i ∈ I.
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
It is worth emphasizing that according to the above representation theorem the social
observer should not impose any extra cautiousness beyond what is admitted by the
range of individuals’ beliefs. This is a reasonable restriction, although it might be the
case that the observer would like to impose extra cautiousness because of paternalistic
considerations.
Our sense is that the above theorem is an intermediate case: The observer attributes
to each individual i a set of recommendations that are related not only to individual
i’s belief, but also to other individuals’ beliefs. As monotonicity (A.3) is assumed
throughout, the difference between the above theorem and Proposition 3 is purely
attributed to the difference in the Pareto-type conditions that are imposed.
On the other hand, one could require that the social observer’s preference ranking of
Lemma 3 satisfy the S-separability axiom. In this case, his preference ranking would
be represented by the evaluation formula of Theorem 2 where each state-dependent
vector of weights in Is (p) depends on elements of the set 	 (p) and is represented
as a normalized weighed average of beliefs held by individuals for state s, and where
each belief of the social observer also depends on elements of the set 	 (p) and is
represented as a weighed average of individuals’ beliefs. Formally:
Theorem 4 Under the assumptions of Lemma 3, the continuous weak order 0 over
R
|I|×|S| satisfies S-separability (A.2) if and only if for every profile of beliefs p =
(pi )i∈I the continuous weak order 0 has the ex post representation form of Theorem
2 where
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S(p) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
⎛
⎝
∑
i∈I
∑
J∈I(p)
γi J pJs
⎞
⎠
s∈S
: γ ∈ 	(p)
⎫
⎬
⎭
and
Is(p) =
{( ∑
J∈I(p) γi J pJs∑
j∈I
∑
J∈I(p) γ j J pJs
)
i∈I
: γ ∈ 	(p)
}
for all s ∈ S.
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
The above representation theorem highlights the strength of the S-separability
axiom in determining the social observer’s aversion to uncertainty, which cannot go
beyond what is admitted by the range of individuals’ beliefs.
5.3 Back to the examples
Going back to the examples presented in Sect. 3, the question that arises is whether
our social welfare functions are able to avoid the stringent conclusions drawn from
the separability axioms.
In Example 1, we concluded that social indifference between prospects u′ and v′
should prevail when the social observer satisfies the axiom of event-wise separability,
the states are equiprobable and he judges prospects u and v as equally good. Also,
we noted that Diamond (1967) objects to the social indifference between u′ and v′ by
arguing that in that type of situation one would expect an impartial observer to deem v′
as better than u′. The reason for this is that under v′ Amy and Bob have equal chances
to score a high level of utility, whereas u′ puts Bob at his low level and Amy at her
high level, with certainty. On this basis, Diamond (1967) concludes that the social
observer should not follow Savages’ axioms and calls for social rankings that exhibit
more ex ante inequality aversion.
The ex ante social welfare criteria of Proposition 3 and Theorem 3 provide a positive
answer to Diamond’s call. Indeed, provided that the size of the set of welfare weights,
I (p), is large enough, that is, provided that the social observer is sufficiently averse
to ex ante inequalities, those social criteria will rank v′ strictly above u′. In contrast,
the ex post social welfare criteria of Proposition 4 and Theorem 4 judge u′ and v′ as
equally good. This is so because the axiom of S-separability (A.2) prevents the social
observer from endorsing any ex ante inequality aversion.
The objective of Example 2 is to show that an impartial social observer is forced to
judge prospect u′ as equally good as prospect v′ when he satisfies the group-event-wise
separability axiom, the two states are equiprobable and he judges prospects u and v as
equally good. We objected against this social indifference by arguing that in that type
of situation there are equally compelling reasons for the social observer to judge one
prospect better than the other. From an ex ante perspective, one reason for ranking u′
strictly above v′ is that u′ is socially safer than v′. Indeed, under u′ Amy will survive
any natural disaster while Bob will die certainly, whereas under v′ Amy and Bob will
either both die in the case of a natural disaster or will both survive if no natural disaster
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happens. However, for those who seek an ex post inequality averse criterion, prospect
v′ should be judged to be better than u′ given that v′ is less unequal than u′. Indeed, v′
puts both Amy and Bob at their high levels in one state and both at their low levels in
the other state, whereas u′ puts Bob at his low level and Amy at her high level, with
certainty. Some of the characterized classes partly resolve this objection.
Indeed, on the one hand, the ex ante social welfare criterion of Theorem 3, which
assesses prospects by applying the Collective ex ante Pareto principle, induces a strict
ranking between u′ and v′. More precisely, it would rank u′ strictly above v′ when the
social observer is not too inequality averse and when every individual i is sufficiently
averse to uncertainty. Put differently, the ranking u′ p0 v′ would prevail when the
set I (p) is sufficiently small and the set Si (p) is sufficiently large for each individual
i . However, the opposite ranking v′ p0 u′ can be obtained when the social observer
is sufficiently averse to inequality as well as when every individual i displays a suf-
ficiently small aversion to uncertainty; that is, the ranking v′ p0 u′ would prevail
when the set I (p) is sufficiently large and the set Si (p) is sufficiently small for each
individual i .
On the other hand, the ex ante social welfare criterion of Proposition 3, which
evaluates prospects on the basis of the ex ante Pareto principle, is much less flexible
that the former one. Indeed, for the same reasons seen above, this criterion can induce
the ranking u′ p0 v′. The opposite ranking is still possible when both Amy and Bob
believe that state 1 is very likely, but this defense is rather weak and artificial.
Like the ex ante criterion of Theorem 3, the ex post welfare criterion of Theorem
4 is flexible enough to allow the social observer to rank the prospects u′ and v′ in
either way. Indeed, the ranking u′ p0 v′ will prevail when Is (p) is not too averse
to ex post inequality in each state of nature and the social observer is sufficiently
averse to uncertainty, whereas the opposite ranking v′ p0 u′ will prevail when Is (p)
is sufficiently averse to inequality in each state and the social observer exhibits a
sufficiently low uncertainty aversion. By contrast, under the ex ante Pareto principle,
the welfare criterion of Proposition 4 ranks u′ and v′ as equally good. The reason is
that the social observer’s preference ranking satisfies the group-event-wise separability
axiom, that is, GE-separability.
Example 3 shows that even the I-separability axiom is problematic given that it
forces an impartial social observer to view the prospects u′ and v′ as equally good,
though there are compelling reasons for ranking one prospect strictly above the other.
Indeed, one can see from Table 6 that prospect v′ leads to an ex post equal distribution
of utilities, whereas prospect u′ puts either Amy at her high level and Bob at his low
level in state 1, or Amy at her low level and Bob at his high level in state 2. Thus,
for those who seek an ex post inequality averse criterion, v′ should be ranked strictly
above u′ given that v′ is less unequal than u′. However, on the basis of social safety,
an opposite conclusion can be supported. Indeed, u′ is socially riskless in the sense
that either Amy or Bob will survive any natural disaster, whereas v′ is a socially risky
prospect because there is a probability of 1/2 that the entire society will become extinct.
Therefore, this example calls for a flexibility in how the social observer should rank
those two prospects.
Unfortunately, our ex ante social welfare criteria of Proposition 3 and Theorem
3 do not leave any room for flexibility because they both satisfy the I-separability
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Table 7 Summary of implications
Socially desirable ranking Example 1 Example 2 Example 3
v′ p0 u′ Flexible Flexible
Ex ante Pareto:
Proposition 3 (ex ante form) v′ p0 u′ v′ p0 u′ v′ ∼p0 u′
Proposition 4 (ex post form) v′ ∼p0 u′ v′ ∼p0 u′ v′ ∼p0 u′
Collective ex ante Pareto:
Theorem 3 (ex ante form) v′ p0 u′ Flexible v′ ∼p0 u′
Theorem 4 (ex post form) v′ ∼p0 u′ Flexible Flexible
axiom. This negative conclusion is not overturned under the ex ante Pareto principle
and the S-separability axiom given that the social preference ranking of Proposition 4
has a weighted utilitarian-type representation. However, the conclusion is overturned
by the ex post social welfare criterion of Theorem 4, which evaluates prospects by
applying the Collective ex ante Pareto principle. Indeed, on the one hand, this ex post
form induces the ranking u′ p0 v′ when Is(p) is sufficiently ex post utilitarian in each
state of nature as well as when the social observer is sufficiently averse to uncertainty.
On the other hand, it induces the opposite ranking v′ p0 u′ when Is(p) is sufficiently
averse to inequality in each state of nature as well as when the social observer exhibits
a sufficiently low uncertainty aversion.
The above discussion is summarized in Table 7.
6 Conclusion
Social preferences of uncertain prospects are representable in the additive form when
seemingly mild separability conditions are imposed. This social representation is not
fully satisfactory because it excludes not only any concern of fairness but also any
concern of uncertainty. Moreover, by common consent, it is desirable to have social
welfare rankings of uncertain prospects that take into account both inequality and
uncertainty considerations.
On this basis, the paper builds a framework that allows for an explicit incorporation
of inequality aversion and uncertainty aversion in the social evaluation of uncertain
prospects. It does so by imposing a common set of axioms that capture a notion of
social rationality that differs from the standard Bayesian rationality. Indeed, society is
assumed to prescribe, either to each individual when the ex ante individual well-being
is favored or to itself when the ex post individual is favored, following the MEU theory
of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
Within this framework, the paper analyzes the consequences of dropping the famil-
iar principles of weak separability, namely, individual-wise separability and state-wise
separability. Specifically, by positing individual-wise separability it offers a represen-
tation theorem for ex ante uncertainty-inequality-sensitive social preferences. On the
other hand, a representation theorem for ex post uncertainty-inequality-sensitive social
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preferences is offered under state-wise separability. The normative appeal of these
social representations is that they avoid some of the serious shortcomings implied by
the conjunction operation of the separability conditions, addressing particularly the
utilitarian indifference to inequalities in utility as shown in the examples of section 3.
Moreover, each representation theorem eases the tension between the two prominent
egalitarian approaches to social decision under uncertainty by incorporating as many
merits of the other egalitarian approach as possible.
Under individual-wise separability, that is, in the ex ante approach, the social
observer assigns a set of beliefs to each individual while he retains for himself a
set of welfare weights. On this basis, he evaluates an uncertain prospect by first com-
puting its expected value for each individual i with respect to the worst belief assigned
to this individual i and then by computing the weighted sum of these data with respect
to the vector of welfare weights that put greater weight on worse-off individuals.
Under state-wise separability, that is, in the ex post approach, the social observer
assigns a set of welfare weights to each possible state of nature as well as a set of
beliefs to himself. Thus, to find the evaluation of a prospect, the social observer needs
first to compute the worst weighted sum of individuals’ utilities in each state of nature
by using the state-dependent welfare weights and then compute the weighted sum of
these data with respect to the worst social belief.
We test how flexible the characterized social preferences are by considering the
requirement on how much individuals are responsible for their beliefs.
First, we impose the ordinary ex ante Pareto criterion, which prescribes that if each
individual prefers one prospect over another one according to their actual beliefs, then
the social observer should respect this. Thus, ex ante Pareto requires that everybody
is perfectly and personally responsible for her actual belief. Under ex ante Pareto, the
ex ante approach cannot allow any role for an uncertainty aversion, whereas it allows
for an inequality aversion freely. On the other hand, the ex post approach excludes not
only any concern of uncertainty but also any concern of fairness.
Second, we impose another ex ante Pareto concept that has been suggested else-
where by Gayer et al. (2014). We name this Pareto criterion as Collective ex ante Pareto.
It restricts the standard Pareto argument to cases where each individual believes that a
prospect is an improvement over another prospect for herself and for all other individ-
uals. Therefore, it requires a collective evaluation of actual individual beliefs. Under
Collective ex ante Pareto, both approaches allow for more desirable and flexible social
rankings, while they do not agree in general. Moreover, the social observer cannot
exercise any excessive paternalism because the individual set of beliefs and social set
of beliefs need to be within what is admitted by the range of individual beliefs.
Let us conclude by discussing future research directions. More realistically, social
decisions take place dynamically and so uncertainty resolves gradually as time passes.
This creates the problem of how we can make social decisions consistently over time,
since there is a tension between ex ante fairness and ex post fairness. This motivates
us to investigate how much inequality aversion and ambiguity aversion can be allowed
without prejudicing dynamic consistency as well as how such aversions are restricted
by how much individuals are responsible for their beliefs.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1 Let the premises hold. It is fairly easy to check that if the social
preference has the functional form given in (1), then it satisfies the axioms. Thus,
fix any profile of beliefs p = (pi )i∈I such that pi ∈ ◦ (S) and suppose that the
continuous weak order p0 satisfies the axioms.
Thus, for each individual i , the individual i’s ex ante welfare ordering pi over R|S|,
given in Definition 1, inherits all properties satisfied by the social preference p0 . By
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), there exists a closed and convex set of strictly positive
probability vectors on S, Si (p) ⊆ ◦ (S), such that the individual i’s ex ante welfare
ordering is represented in the form
ui pi vi ⇐⇒ min
σi ∈Si (p)
∑
s∈S
σisuis ≥ min
σi ∈Si (p)
∑
s∈S
σisvis, for all i ∈ I.
Next, given that by Lemma 1 there exists a unique, closed and convex set of strictly
positive probability vectors on I × S, (p) ⊆ ◦ (I × S), let us define the set of
welfare weights I (p) by
I (p) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
(
∑
s∈S
λis
)
i∈I
: λ ∈ (p)
⎫
⎬
⎭ .
It follows from its definition that I (p) is a unique, closed and convex set of strictly
positive probability vectors on I.
It suffices to show
min
λ∈(p)
∑
i∈I
∑
s∈S
λisuis = min
α∈I (p)
∑
i∈I
αi
(
min
σi ∈Si (p)
∑
s∈S
σisuis
)
, for all u ∈ R|I|×|S|.
(5)
To this end, fix any prospect u. For each individual i ∈ I and each state s ∈ S,
define u∗is by
u∗is = min
μi ∈Si (p)
∑
t∈S
μi t uit ≡ w∗i .
Thus, the matrix u∗ = [u∗is
]
i∈I,s∈S ∈ R|I|×|S| is a prospect.
By this definition, we have
u∗i ∼pi ui , for all i ∈ I,
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where u∗i =
[
u∗is
]
s∈S ∈ R|S| is the i th row vector of the prospect u∗. Since by remark
1 the social preference satisfies the ex ante welfare ordering indifference condition, it
follows that
u∗ ∼p0 u,
thus
min
λ∈(p)
∑
i∈I
∑
s∈S
λisu
∗
is = min
λ∈(p)
∑
i∈I
∑
s∈S
λisuis .
By the definition of the prospect u∗, we have
min
λ∈(p)
∑
i∈I
∑
s∈S
λisu
∗
is = min
λ∈(p)
∑
i∈I
w∗i
∑
s∈S
λis
= min
α∈I (p)
∑
i∈I
αiw
∗
i
= min
α∈I (p)
∑
i∈I
αi
(
min
σi ∈Si (p)
∑
s∈S
σisuis
)
.
Therefore, (5) holds. unionsq
Proof of Theorem 2 Though the proof of this representation theorem is similar to that
of Theorem 1, we report it for the sake of completeness. Thus, let the premises hold.
It is fairly easy to check that if the social preference has the functional form given in
(2), then it satisfies the axioms. Thus, fix any profile of beliefs p = (pi )i∈I such that
pi ∈ ◦ (S), and suppose that the continuous weak order p0 satisfies the axioms.
Thus, for each state s, the ex post welfare ordering p,s0 over R|I|, given in Def-
inition 2, inherits all properties satisfied by the social preference p0 . By Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989), there exists a closed and convex set of strictly positive welfare
weights on I, Is (p) ⊆ ◦ (I), such that the ex post welfare ordering at the state s is
represented in the form
us p,s0 vs ⇐⇒ min
αs∈Is (p)
∑
i∈I
αsi uis ≥ min
αs∈Is (p)
∑
i∈I
αsivis .
Next, given that by Lemma 1 there exists a unique, closed and convex set of strictly
positive probability vectors on I × S, (p) ⊆ ◦ (I × S), let us define the set of
probability distributions S(p) by
S(p) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
(
∑
i∈I
λis
)
s∈S
: λ ∈ (p)
⎫
⎬
⎭ .
It follows from its definition that S(p) is a unique, closed and convex set of strictly
positive probability vectors on S.
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It suffices to show
min
λ∈(p)
∑
i∈I
∑
s∈S
λisuis = min
σ∈S(p)
∑
s∈S
σs
(
min
αs∈Is (p)
∑
i∈I
αsi uis
)
, for all u ∈ R|I|×|S|.
(6)
Fix any prospect u. For each individual i ∈ I and each state s ∈ S, define u∗is by
u∗is = min
αs∈Is (p)
∑
j∈I
αs j u js ≡ w∗s .
Thus, the matrix u∗ = [u∗is
]
i∈I,s∈S ∈ R|I|×|S| is a prospect.
By this definition, we have
u∗s ∼p,s0 us, for all s ∈ S,
where u∗s =
[
u∗is
]
i∈I ∈ R|I| is the sth column vector of the prospect u∗. Since
by remark 3 the social preference satisfies the ex post welfare ordering indifference
condition, it follows that
u∗ ∼p0 u,
thus
min
λ∈(p)
∑
i∈I
∑
s∈S
λisu
∗
is = min
λ∈(p)
∑
i∈I
∑
s∈S
λisuis .
By the definition of the prospect u∗, we have
min
λ∈(p)
∑
i∈I
∑
s∈S
λisu
∗
is = min
λ∈(p)
∑
s∈S
w∗s
∑
i∈I
λis
= min
σ∈S(p)
∑
s∈S
σsw
∗
s
= min
σ∈S(p)
∑
s∈S
σs
(
min
αs∈Is (p)
∑
i∈I
αsi uis
)
.
Therefore, (6) holds. unionsq
Proof of Lemma 2 Fix any profile p of beliefs and any two social prospects u and v.
Suppose that the social preference p0 satisfies ex ante Pareto and ex ante strict Pareto.
Suppose that u ≥ v. Then, ui ≥ vi for all i ∈ I. It immediately follows that
pi ui ≥ pivi for all i ∈ I. Then, u p0 v by ex ante Pareto. Hence, the social
preference satisfies Monotonicity.
To show that the social preference satisfies I-separability, fix any individual i and
suppose that (ui , u−i ) p0 (vi , u−i ). To prove that (ui , v−i ) 
p
0 (vi , v−i ), observe
that according to Definition 1 it holds that ui pi vi . Suppose that pivi > pi ui . Then,
ex ante strict Pareto implies that (vi , u−i ) p0 (ui , u−i ), producing a contradiction.
Therefore, we have that pi ui ≥ pivi . Since pi ui ≥ pivi and p jv j = p jv j for every
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individual j = i , Ex ante Pareto implies (ui , v−i ) p0 (vi , v−i ), as we sought. Since
the choice of u−i and v−i was arbitrary, we conclude that the social preference satisfies
I-separability. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 3 Let the premises hold. It is fairly easy to check that if the
social preference has the functional form given in (1), then it satisfies the axioms.
Thus, fix any profile of beliefs p = (pi )i∈I such that pi ∈ ◦ (S), and suppose that
the continuous weak order p0 satisfies the axioms.
Lemma 2 implies that the social preference p0 satisfies Monotonicity and I-
separability. Theorem 1 implies that p0 has the ex ante functional form given in
(1). What is left is to show that (3) holds.
Fix any individual i . First, we show that pi ∈ Si (p). Assume, to the contrary,
that pi /∈ Si (p). Thus, the separation theorem implies that there is a nonzero vector
ui ∈ R|S| such that
β ≡ min
σi ∈Si (p)
σi ui > pi ui .
Fix any real number γ , and let γ−i denote the |I\ {i}| × |S| matrix with all entries
equal to γ . Moreover, with abuse of notation, we also use β to denote the vector in
R
|S| with all entries equal to real number β. Thus, (ui , γ−i ) is a prospect such that i
obtains ui and everybody else obtains γ with certainty. Also, (β, γ−i ) is a prospect
such that i obtains β with certainty and everybody else obtains γ with surety.
Since
min
α∈I (p)
⎛
⎝αi min
σi ∈Si (p)
σi ui + γ
∑
j =i
α j
⎞
⎠ = min
α∈I (p)
⎛
⎝αiβ + γ
∑
j =i
α j
⎞
⎠ ,
it follows from (1) that
(ui , γ−i ) p0 (β, γ−i ).
Furthermore, since p0 satisfies ex ante strict Pareto, it holds that pi ui ≥ piβ. Since
piβ = β, we have that pi ui ≥ β, which is a contradiction. Thus, we have that
pi ∈ Si (p).
Next, we show that Si (p) ⊆ {pi }. Assume, to the contrary, that {pi } is a proper
subset of Si (p). Thus, the separation theorem implies that there is a nonzero vector
ui ∈ R|S| such that
pi ui > min
σi ∈Si (p)
σi ui ≡ β.
Again, fix any real number γ , and let γ−i denote the |I\ {i}| × |S| matrix with all
entries equal to γ . As above, we also use β to denote the vector in R|S| with all entries
equal to real number β. Thus, since
min
α∈I (p)
⎛
⎝αiβ + γ
∑
j =i
α j
⎞
⎠ = min
α∈I (p)
⎛
⎝αi min
μ∈Si (p)
σi ui + γ
∑
j =i
α j
⎞
⎠ ,
we have that
(β, γ−i ) p0 (ui , γ−i ).
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Since p0 satisfies ex ante strict Pareto, it holds that piβ ≥ pi ui . Again, since piβ = β,
we have that β ≥ pi ui , which is a contradiction. Thus, we conclude that Si (p) = {pi }.
unionsq
Proof of Proposition 4 Let the premises hold. It is fairly easy to check that if the social
preference has the functional form given in part (a) or in part (b) of the statement, then it
satisfies the axioms. Thus, fix any profile of beliefs p = (pi )i∈I such that pi ∈ ◦ (S),
and suppose that the continuous weak order p0 satisfies the axioms.
Since the social preference p0 satisfies ex ante Pareto and ex ante strict Pareto,
Lemma 2 implies that it satisfies Monotonicity and I-separability. Thus, the social
preference p0 is represented in the additive form by
∑
i∈I
∑
s∈S
λis(p)uis for all u ∈ R|I|×|S|,
where λis(p) > 0 for each individual i and each state s and where
∑
i∈I
∑
s∈S λis(p)= 1.
Since by ex ante Pareto the profile (λis(p))s∈S must be proportional to individual
i’s beliefs, pi , λis(p) has the form
λis(p) = βi (p) pis for all s ∈ S.
Observe that βi (p) > 0. Since, moreover,
1 =
∑
i∈I
∑
s∈S
λis(p) =
∑
i∈I
∑
s∈S
βi (p)pis =
∑
i∈I
βi (p)
∑
s∈S
pis =
∑
i∈I
βi (p),
we obtain β(p) ≡ (βi (p))i∈I ∈ ◦(I).
From this, it follows that the social preference p0 is represented in the additive
form by ∑
i∈I
βi (p)
∑
s∈S
pisuis for all u ∈ R|I|×|S|.
One can easily see that this corresponds to the ex ante representation form of
Theorem 1 with the specification that I (p) = {β (p)} and Si (p) = {pi } for all i ∈ I.
This completes part (a).
To prove part (b), note that
∑
i∈I
βi (p)
∑
s∈S
pisuis =
∑
s∈S
∑
i∈I
βi (p)pisuis
=
∑
s∈S
⎛
⎝
∑
j∈I
β j (p)p js
⎞
⎠
(
∑
i∈I
(
βi (p)pis∑
j∈I β j (p)p js
)
uis
)
.
One can easily check that
(∑
j∈I β j (p)p js
)
s∈S
∈ ◦(S) and that
(
βi (p)pis∑
j∈I β j (p)p js
)
i∈I∈ ◦(I) for all s ∈ S. Therefore, part (b) corresponds to the ex post representation
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form of Theorem 2 where
S (p) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
⎛
⎝
∑
j∈I
β j (p) p js
⎞
⎠
s∈S
⎫
⎬
⎭ , and
Is (p) =
{(
βi (p) pis∑
j∈I β j (p) p js
)
i∈I
}
for all s ∈ S,
as we sought. unionsq
Proof of Lemma 3 Let the premises hold. It is fairly easy to check that if the social
preference has the functional form given in (4), then it satisfies the axioms. Thus,
fix any profile of beliefs p = (pi )i∈I such that pi ∈ ◦ (S), and suppose that the
continuous weak order p0 satisfies the axioms.
Let us define the ranking ∗p0 induced over R|I|×|I(p)| by the social preference 
p
0
as follows:
u p0 v ⇐⇒ x ∗p0 y, for all u, v ∈ R|I|×|S|,
where x ≡ (pJ ui )i∈I,J∈I(p) and y ≡ (pJ vi )i∈I,J∈I(p). One can easily check that
this ranking is complete, transitive, continuous, and convex and, moreover, it satisfies
Homogeneity (A.4), UI-Aversion (A.6 ), Collective ex ante Pareto (A.9) and Collective
ex ante strict Pareto (A.10).
To show that the ranking also satisfies CE-Independence (A.5), it suffices to show
that for all u, v ∈ R|I|×|S| it holds
x ∗p0 y ⇒ x + α1I×I(p) ∗p0 y + α1I×I(p),
where x ≡ (pJ ui )i∈I,J∈I(p) and y ≡ (pJ vi )i∈I,J∈I(p), where 1I×I(p) ∈ R|I|×|I(p)|
denotes the |I | × |I(p)| matrix whose entries are all 1 and α is a scalar. This follows
from the fact that p0 satisfies CE-Independence (A.5) and from the fact that we can
take (pJ (ui + α1S))i∈I,J∈I(p) = x + α1I×I(p) and (pJ (ui + α1S))i∈I,J∈I(p) =
y + α1I×I(p).
Since ∗p0 satisfies Collective ex ante Pareto (A.9), one can also see that the ranking
satisfies Monotonicity (A.3). By Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), there exists a closed
convex set 	(p) ⊆ ◦(I × I(p)) such that, for all u, v ∈ R|I|×|S|,
x ∗p0 y ⇐⇒ min
γ∈	(p)
∑
i∈I
∑
J∈I(p)
γi J xi J ≥ min
γ∈	(p)
∑
i∈I
∑
J∈I(p)
γi J yi J ,
where x ≡ (pJ ui )i∈I,J∈I(p) and y ≡ (pJ vi )i∈I,J∈I(p). Thus, by definition of the
ranking ∗p0 , it follows that for all u, v ∈ R|I|×|S| it holds that
u p0 v ⇐⇒ min
γ∈	(p)
∑
i∈I
∑
J∈I(p)
γi J
∑
s∈S
pJsuis ≥ min
γ∈	(p)
∑
i∈I
∑
J∈I(p)
γi J
∑
s∈S
pJsuis ,
as we sought. unionsq
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Proof of Theorem 3 Let the premises hold. It is fairly easy to check that if the social
preference has the functional form specified in the statement of Theorem 3, then it
satisfies the axioms. Thus, fix any profile of beliefs p = (pi )i∈I such that pi ∈ ◦ (S),
and suppose that the continuous weak order p0 satisfies the axioms.
Thus, for each individual i , the individual i’s ex ante welfare ordering pi over R|S|,
given in Definition 1, inherits all properties satisfied by the social preference p0 . By
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), there exists a closed and convex set of strictly positive
probability vectors on S, Si (p) ⊆ ◦ (S), such that the individual i’s ex ante welfare
ordering is represented in the form
ui pi vi ⇐⇒ min
σi ∈Si (p)
∑
s∈S
σisuis ≥ min
σi ∈Si (p)
∑
s∈S
σisvis , for all i ∈ I.
Next, given that by Lemma 3 there exists a unique, closed and convex set of strictly
positive probability vectors on I × I (p), 	 (p) ⊆ ◦ (I × I (p)), let us define the
set of welfare weights I (p) by
I (p) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
⎛
⎝
∑
J∈I(p)
γi J
⎞
⎠
i∈I
: γ ∈ 	(p)
⎫
⎬
⎭ .
It follows from its definition that I (p) is a unique, closed and convex set of strictly
positive probability vectors on I.
To complete the proof, it suffices to show, for all u ∈ R|I|×|S|, it holds
min
γ∈	(p)
⎛
⎝
∑
i∈I
∑
J∈I(p)
γi J
∑
s∈S
pJsuis
⎞
⎠ = min
α∈I (p)
∑
i∈I
αi
(
min
σi ∈Si (p)
∑
s∈S
σisuis
)
. (7)
To this end, fix any prospect u. For each individual i ∈ I and each state s ∈ S,
define u∗is by
u∗is = min
μi ∈Si (p)
∑
t∈S
μi t uit ≡ w∗i .
Thus, the matrix u∗ = [u∗is
]
i∈I,s∈S ∈ R|I|×|S| is a prospect.
By this definition, we have
u∗i ∼pi ui , for all i ∈ I,
where u∗i =
[
u∗is
]
s∈S ∈ R|S| is the i th row vector of the prospect u∗. Since by remark
1 the social preference satisfies the ex ante welfare ordering indifference condition, it
follows that
u∗ ∼p0 u,
123
Fair social decision under uncertainty and belief… 813
thus
min
γ∈	(p)
⎛
⎝
∑
i∈I
∑
J∈I(p)
γi J
∑
s∈S
pJsu∗is
⎞
⎠ = min
γ∈	(p)
⎛
⎝
∑
i∈I
∑
J∈I(p)
γi J
∑
s∈S
pJsuis
⎞
⎠
.
By the definition of the prospect u∗, we have
min
γ∈	(p)
⎛
⎝
∑
i∈I
∑
J∈I(p)
γi J
∑
s∈S
pJsu∗is
⎞
⎠ = min
γ∈	(p)
∑
i∈I
w∗i
∑
J∈I(p)
γi J
∑
s∈S
pJs
= min
γ∈	(p)
∑
i∈I
w∗i
∑
J∈I(p)
γi J
= min
α∈I (p)
∑
i∈I
αiw
∗
i
= min
α∈I (p)
∑
i∈I
αi
(
min
σi ∈Si (p)
∑
s∈S
σisuis
)
.
Thus, (7) holds. This means that
Si (p) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
⎛
⎝
∑
J∈I(p)
γi J pJs
⎞
⎠
s∈S
: γ ∈ 	(p)
⎫
⎬
⎭ for all i ∈ I,
as we sought. unionsq
Proof of Theorem 4 Let the premises hold. It is fairly easy to check that if the social
preference has the functional form specified in the statement of Theorem 4, then it
satisfies the axioms. Thus, fix any profile of beliefs p = (pi )i∈I such that pi ∈ ◦ (S),
and suppose that the continuous weak order p0 satisfies the axioms.
Thus, for each state s, the ex post welfare ordering p,s0 over R|I|, given in Def-
inition 2, inherits all properties satisfied by the social preference p0 . By Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989), there exists a closed and convex set of strictly positive welfare
weights on I, Is (p) ⊆ ◦ (I), such that the ex post welfare ordering at the state s is
represented in the form
us p,s0 vs ⇐⇒ min
αs∈Is (p)
∑
i∈I
αsi uis ≥ min
αs∈Is (p)
∑
i∈I
αsivis , for all s ∈ S.
Next, given that by Lemma 3 there exists a unique, closed and convex set of strictly
positive probability vectors on I × I (p), 	 (p) ⊆ ◦ (I × I (p)), let us define the
set of social beliefs S(p) by
S(p) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
⎛
⎝
∑
i∈I
∑
J∈I(p)
γi J pJs
⎞
⎠
s∈S
: γ ∈ 	(p)
⎫
⎬
⎭ .
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It follows from its definition that S(p) is a unique, closed and convex set of strictly
positive probability vectors on S.
To complete the proof, it suffices to show, for all u ∈ R|I|×|S|, it holds that
min
γ∈	(p)
∑
i∈I
∑
J∈I(p)
γi J
∑
s∈S
pJsuis = min
μ∈S(p)
∑
s∈S
μs min
αs∈Is (p)
∑
i∈I
αisuis . (8)
Fix any prospect u. For each individual i ∈ I and each state s ∈ S, define u∗is by
u∗is = min
αs∈Is (p)
∑
j∈I
αs j u js ≡ w∗s .
Thus, the matrix u∗ = [u∗is
]
i∈I,s∈S ∈ R|I|×|S| is a prospect.
By this definition, we have
u∗s ∼p,s0 us, for all s ∈ S,
where u∗s =
[
u∗is
]
i∈I ∈ R|I| is the sth column vector of the prospect u∗. Since
by remark 3 the social preference satisfies the ex post welfare ordering indifference
condition, it follows that
u∗ ∼p0 u,
thus
min
γ∈	(p)
∑
i∈I
∑
J∈I(p)
γi J
∑
s∈S
pJsu∗is = min
γ∈	(p)
∑
i∈I
∑
J∈I(p)
γi J
∑
s∈S
pJsuis .
By the definition of the prospect u∗, we also have
min
γ∈	(p)
∑
i∈I
∑
J∈I(p)
γi J
∑
s∈S
pJsu∗is = min
γ∈	(p)
∑
s∈S
⎛
⎝
∑
J∈I(p)
γi J
∑
s∈S
pJs
⎞
⎠w∗s
= min
σ∈S(p)
∑
s∈S
σsw
∗
s
= min
σ∈S(p)
∑
s∈S
σs
(
min
αs∈Is (p)
∑
i∈I
αsi uis
)
.
Thus, (8) holds. This means that
Is(p) =
{( ∑
J∈I(p) γi J pJs∑
j∈I
∑
J∈I(p) γ j J pJs
)
i∈I
: γ ∈ 	(p)
}
for all s ∈ S,
as we sought. unionsq
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